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עמוד:VIII
poses for the discourse of human rights and values . For example , the value of human life must yield to the precept of sanctifying the divine name . The circles of holiness create distinctions and hierarchies among human beings : between Priests and Levites and Israelites , between Jews of impeccable lineage and converts or those whose lineage is flawed , between men and women , between those who are whole of body and those with disabilities . The value of dignity is set aside for a number of precepts : we are not required to honor our father and mother if they tell us to transgress a commandment . The value attached to intimate relationships and marriage must give way to the prohibitions related to forbidden unions and holiness : the ban on a kohen’s marrying a divorcee and the problematic status of agunot ) wives whose husbands have disappeared ( , mamzerim ) the children of forbidden relationships ( , and mesoravot get ) women whose husbands refuse to give them a divorce ( are examples of situations in which the notion of the sanctity of marriage takes precedence over the discourse of the right to participate in an intimate relationship . The two tracks are presented not as merging but as colliding–the track of the “ image of God , ” which is the basis of human rights , and the track of “ a kingdom of priests and holy nation , " which constrains and limits universal human values . How do the Torah and Halakhah deal with the tension between these two tracks or two opposing systems for living ? The fundamental axiom is that we are not dealing with tension and contradiction between the Torah and some external and alien culture , but with an internal tension that stems from the existence of two principles that coexist within the Torah itself . Dealing with and resolving these two opposing poles is the very soul of talmudic thought . It is based on the notion that “ both these and
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